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Volatility in agricultural investment remains a puzzle. This paper investigates the extent to which an
active agricultural policy can be the source of such volatility. Specifically, it addresses how policy
uncertainty, where the political process creates parameter uncertainty and noise about the precise
timing of a reform, influences investment at the farm level. The motivation for the analysis is the
ongoing round of multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO and the recent history of the OECD
countries, where far reaching agricultural policy reforms have been preceded by prolonged
negotiations, public debates and parliamentary processes. The specific question raised concerns the
incentive effects originating from the uncertainty related to the reformation of blue box subsidies. The
blue box is an exemption from the rule within the WTO that all subsidies linked to production must be
reduced or kept at a minimal level. The blue box includes payments directly linked to acreage or
animal numbers. Although, the blue box is a permanent provision in the Agriculture Agreement, these
support instruments is likely going to be the ones most challenged in the new WTO-round (Blandford;
Josling and Tangermann). The issue is not whether changes in the blue box provisions will take place,
but how long time it will take to reach an agreement and how much additional support reduction will
be possible.
Uncertainty about agricultural policy support linked to the capital stock is a relevant feature of
the decision making process in the farm firm since future policy support influences today’s investment.
A retroperspective glance at recent reforms of agricultural policy reforms undertaken gives that
changes can be either rather sweeping or appear as frequent, small changes in support parameters.
The recurrent changes characterizing the CAP, recently provided by the Agenda 2000 reform
exemplifies the latter type. In order to accurately model the effect of uncertainty it is crucial to identify
which type of reform (sweeping or frequent) that are at hand. This paper develops a dynamic
stochastic model of the capital employment explicitly taking into account linked support payments2
when the proposed policy is expected to be in existence for a long time span. This part of the paper
extends the tax-policy model of Alvarez, Kanniainen and Södersten (AKS) to include the effects of
public policy uncertainty on the stock of real capital. The basic idea behind the model developed is
that the future change in linked support is viewed as a shift in the control problem. After the reform
have been implemented the world is deterministic since the new policy support is expected to stay
unchanged. Prior to the reform, the farm operator updates conditional probabilities of the reform time
and support level so that the problem may be solved by ordinary techniques and linked to the post-
reform period. It is shown that the announcement of a reform creates anticipatory effects upon the
incentives to invest and that these effects are reinforced by uncertainty when there exists expectations
of a reduction in support levels. Adhering to the stochastic modeling approach in the AKS paper also
provides a mean of separating the impact of parameter uncertainty from the effects of timing
uncertainty. This separation is not possible with conventional models of stochastic control.
In the second part of the paper the incentive effects originating from a reduction of the
European acreage payments system is illustrated. The difference in the cost of land between the pre-
reform regime and the post-reform regime is analyzed using Beta-distributions to represent different
cases of size and timing uncertainty. This part of the paper contributes to the existing uncertainty
literature by revealing the combined effects upon the investment incentives from both size and timing
uncertainty and the ambiguous effect originating from a simultaneous increase in the two forms of
uncertainty. The final section concludes.3
The Model
The starting point of the conceptual model is a farm operator who is informed that there will be an
agricultural policy reform in the future and that the post-reform system is going to be in existence for a
long time span. Public intervention is introduced through the exogenous support instrument  ( ) w s
linked to and proportionate in the stock of capital. Let t* denote the date of the regime shift in public
policy. Both the timing and the size of the anticipated reform are assumed to be unknown and
stochastic. It is, however, assumed that the farm operator views the expected size and timing of the
reform as independent events. The argument for this could for instance be that the believes of the
farmer with respect to the magnitude of the reform does not hinges upon the time of implementation.
The operator is assumed to have a well defined and continuous probability density function (pdf) for
the timing of the reform over the time interval between d and u given by  [ ] g d u : , ﬁ + R , with an
associated continuous cumulative probability distribution function (cdf)  [ ] [ ] G d u : , , ﬁ 01 . In addition,
the farmer has formed believes of the size of the reform given by the pdf over the support parameter
interval  [ ] h a b : , ﬁ + R  with a corresponding cdf H.
The aggregated capital stock K of the productive enterprise is characterized by exponential
decay at the rate d  and follows the dynamics  ( ) ( ) ( ) & K t I t K t = -d  with the initial value given. To




- = m 0 where  K m  represents the
shadow value of the capital stock, it is assumed the production function of the farm firm is concave,
has constant returns to scale properties and satisfies the standard Inada conditions (Inada). It is also
assumed that the farm operator faces no restrictions to adjust the variable input factors of the
productive enterprise so the net farm income per unit of time, is defined as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) D s p w p K s s K s p I s qI s
k f , / w t w f = - + - - 1 (1)4
where  () k f .  is the marginal product of capital, p is output price, w is the price of variable inputs, fis
a strictly convex adjustment cost function, I(t) investments, t is the tax rate and q is the price of
capital. s represents time.
Prior to the reform (t<t*), the farm operator faces the problem of determining the optimal
investment policy I(t) to maximize the value V of the productive enterprise, assuming he knows the
form of its post-reform value for all possible realizations of w  and t*. The dynamic stochastic
adjustment problem is
( ) ( )
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where r represents the opportunity rate of return on equity required by the owner of the agricultural
firm net of the effective marginal tax rate on equity.
If the farm operator updates his information in a standard way (Alvarez, Kanniainen and
Södersten) according to the conditional density  [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]( ) P t dst t g s ds G t s t u * * , ˛ > = - ￿ 1 1 ,
where  [ ]( ) t u s , 1  is the indicator function on the set [ ] t u , , then following (Alvarez, Kanniainen,
Södersten; Dasgupta and Heal, 1979, 1974; Nickell), this stochastic problem can be transformed into
an ordinary deterministic control problem linking the optimal programs in the pre-reform and the post-
reform regimes
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The first term in the bracketed part of (3) represents the contribution to the value of the
productive enterprise from net farm earnings prior to the reform. This part is weighted by the
probability that the reform has not taken place. The second term V*(.) in the bracketed term5
in (3) represents the post-reform value of the productive enterprise at the unknown time t*
and is weighted by the probability of a reform in the near future.
To analyze the investment behavior consider first the post-reform regime (i.e. t>t*).
The choice of investment in this regime is deterministic since the implemented reform is
assumed to be in practice for a sufficiently long time. The non-maximized value of the
productive enterprise is given by the net present value of future net farm earnings as
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] $ , V K t I t p w p K s K s p I s qI s ds
r s t
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where  2 w  represents the post-reform value of the support instrument. Applying now the
capital accumulation identity (Alvarez, Kanniainen, Södersten, p. 25)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) K s K t e e I y dy s t s y
t
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under the condition that s t y t s y ‡ ‡ ‡ ,   and   and introducing for the sake of compactness
the mappings






















imply that (4) may be rewritten as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] $ , V K t I t K t q I s p I s ds
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t e = + + + - - -
- - ¥
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(4’)
The economic interpretation of (4’) is now clear. The value of the productive enterprise
consists of two parts. The first part originates from the current stock of capital employed6
and consists of the tax adjusted net present value of the marginal revenue product (6) and
the present value of the support instrument per unit of capital (7). The second part of the
firm value is given by the present value of the cash flow from the future investment program.
It is worth noting that in spite of the assumed constant returns in production the productive
enterprise is of bounded size. This boundness is due to the monotonic convex adjustment
cost which gives that this model leads to the flexible accelerator model of net investment
introduced by Eisner and Strotz.
The optimal constant investment behavior ~ I  in the post-reform regime is obtained
from the integral in (4’). The principles of optimality requires that the productive enterprise
equates the marginal adjustment cost to the present value net return on the marginal unit of
capital. Hence,
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for all  s t ‡ *. Since the value of the productive enterprise at the date t*  ( ) ( ) V K t *  is
defined by adhering to the optimal control from t* and onwards value the value is
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Consider now the pre-reform regime (i.e. t<t*) where uncertainty prevails with
respect to the timing of the reform as well as with respect to the value of the support
parameter in the post-reform regime. For any potential realization of t*, the non-maximized
value of the productive enterprise is
( ) ( ) ( )
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Applying again the capital accumulation equation (5) and changing the order of integration
over the triangular area in the two dimensional plane given by  y t y t ˛ £ £ + R : *,
s y s t ˛ £ £ + R : *and then taking conditional expectations on  ( ) ( ) ( ) $ , , * V K t I t t  with
respect to the timing of the reform as well as expectations with respect to the post-reform
support parameter yields that the value of the productive enterprise is
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The economic interpretation is similar to (4’).  t t E < * is the expectation operator representing
the expectation of the timing of the reform conditional upon that the reform has not been
implemented by time t.  ( ) [ ] E b w2  represents the pre-reform expectation of the value of the
support parameter in the post-reform regime. The first term on the right hand side of (11)
then reflects the contribution to the value of the farm enterprise from currently employed
capital. In comparison to (4’) this term now involves the expected value of the change in the
support instrument. The rest of (11) reflects the value of future investments. This value is
separated into two parts. The first part represent the expected value of investments8
undertaken in the post-reform period [ ] t*,¥  while the second part, that is the integral in
(11), represents the expected value of the investment program during the pre-reform period
[ ) t t , * . Then if the farm operator is risk neutral the principles of optimality now requires that
the marginal adjustment cost is to be equated to the expectation of the present value net
return on the marginal unit of capital. Note that since the integral in (11) is state-independent
with respect to the current as well as the future capital stock, t>0, s is arbitrary and that the
optimality criterion has to be expressed in current value terms, the optimal non-constant
investment behavior is on (0, t*)
( )
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Inspection of (12) and (8) reveals that the investment behavior differs between the pre- and
post-reform regimes. This is due to that future support payments will be made to presently
employed capital. In the pre-reform regime currently held expectations about the timing and
magnitude of the reform will therefore affect investment at the firm level. This effect is absent
in the post-reform regime when the farm operators are confronted with an assumed stable
policy. This finding motivates the separation of farm level investment into a short-run
perspective (the pre-reform regime) and a long-run perspective. In the following section the
analysis will concentrate on the incentive effects in the long-run and short-run originating
from policy uncertainty.9
Incentive effects
The solution of the neoclassical capital accumulation problem defines the implicit rental value
of capital services supplied by the firm to itself. This rental value is the price chargeable for
capital services provided by the capital stock when managed in accordance with maximizing
profits. According to the seminal definition given by Miller & Modigliani the “cost of capital”
is the minimum yield that an investment in real assets must offer to be worthwhile undertaking
from the point of view of the owners of the firm. The underpinning is that the cost of capital
is identical with the implicit rental price. In fact, both Hall and Jorgenson and Miller &
Modigliani showed that under conditions of perfect capital market using the cost of capital
as the discount rate when evaluating prospective investment is equivalent to maximizing the
utility of the owners of the firm. The approach taken is this section follows the later
development in the capital accumulation theory initiated by the work of King. Hence, the
cost of capital concept derived defines the minimum yield required by a rational investor in
order to be indifferent between investment alternatives in- and outside the existing farm
enterprise. Functioning as such a discount rate governing the acceptance of investment also
defines the role for the cost of capital as an incentive mechanism.
To analyze the incentive effects originating from an uncertainty over an agricultural
policy reform a distinction has to be made between the long-run incentives and the short-run
incentives.
The long-run cost of capital is obtained from (4’). According to the assumed
dynamics of the stock of real capital the steady-state level of gross investment is I K * * =d .
Inserting this relationship into (4’) and optimizing with respect to K* yields that
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ¶
¶
a b w t f d d  
 
  $ ,
*
* V K t I t
K
t q p K
r
=




Hence, a sufficient condition for optimal employment of capital in steady-state necessitates
either a non-depreciable capital stock or that the bracketed term in the numerator of (13),
representing the marginal value of an additional capital unit, is zero valued. The cost of
capital is derived out of this latter requirement. Developing the bracketed term in (13)
defines
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) p w p r K q r t
k f - + ¢ =
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as the long-term cost of capital. Expression (14) differs from the standard Hall-Jorgenson
cost of capital formulation in two respects. First, the full marginal return to capital includes an
increase in current adjustment costs per unit of investment. Second, the marginal return
includes a reduction originating from the policy support.
In deriving this incentive effect a further distinction has to be made between the pre-reform
and the post-reform long-term cost of capital measure in the sense that the farm operator
has either not yet entered the region of uncertainty (i.e. t<d) or is in a situation where this
region has been left (i.e. t>u). In the case of t<d, the long-term measure of the cost of
capital must be based on the pre-reform support instrument  1 w  while if the uncertainty
region has been left the appropriate support instrument to use is  2 w .
The short-run (pre-reform) cost of capital is derived from (11). Differentiating with
respect to  ( ) I t  yields
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) p w p r I t q r
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It is straight forward to observe that the pre-reform cost of capital measure differs from the
pre-reform long-term cost of capital measure only by the second term on the right-hand side
of (15). This term reveals the impact upon the cost of capital of an expected reformation of
coupled agricultural policy support and are in the following referred to as the anticipatory
effect. Clearly, this anticipatory effect may be further decomposed into two parts. The first
part corresponds to the expectation of future support levels vis avi current support levels
[ ] E 2 w w - 1. There are two cases depending on the sign of this expectation. If the farm
operator expects that the post-reform level of support is lower than the pre-reform level, the
cost of capital is higher in the short-run than in the long-run and thus creating a disincentive
for investment. On the opposite, if the farm operator expects an increase in the support
levels the short-run cost of capital is lower than the long-run cost of capital. The second part
of the anticipatory effect originates from timing uncertainty by the generated uncertainty with
respect to the accurate discounting horizon. The effect of uncertainty regarding the
magnitude and timing of the reform can now be stated.
Proposition 1 (incentive effects of policy uncertainty). In the meaning of Hartman: A mean
preserving increase in timing uncertainty, in the sense that while the mean of the distribution
remains unaltered the variance (if it exists) increases, will increase current investment if
[ ] E 2 w w - 1 is positive and decrease current investment if  [ ] E 2 w w - 1 is negative. A mean
preserving increase in support parameter uncertainty has no incentive effects.
Proof: The support instrument  ( ) w s  is linear in the stock of real capital by assumption and
therefore both convex and concave. The exponential function  ( )( ) - + - r t e
d u  is clearly convex
for non-negative values of (u -t) so the conditional form of Jensen’s inequality gives12
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for any distribution function.
Numerical illustration of anticipatory adjustments to policy uncertainty
Within the blue box policy instruments, a reform of the European acreage payments system
will be illustrated. The illustration is based on Swedish figures by availability and starts with
support levels as given by the implemented Agenda 2000 reform and extends without loss of
generality to reflect the effect of blue box policy uncertainty in Europe as a hole. Acreage
payments are based on the current support level of 63 ECU/ton and is the single most
important support instrument in Swedish agriculture, amounting to 46 per cent out of the
total support in 1999 (Statistics Sweden, 1999a). For a representative farm of 109 hectares
in the most productive areas of Sweden the total direct support for crops then corresponds
to 10.8 percent on an annual basis out of the total market value of farm land (Ds 1998:70;
Statistics Sweden, 1999b). This will be used as a measure of the current support parameter
1 w . The real tax adjusted discount factor of the farm operator r was assumed to be 8
percent while the tax rate on net farm earnings was assumed to equal 51 percent.
In order to clarify the impact on investment incentives the numerical illustration is
divided into three steps. First, timing uncertainty is analyzed while assuming that the change
the support parameter is known with certainty. In the second step, parameter uncertainty is
analyzed while assuming that the reform date is known. Finally, the effects of simultaneous
parameter and timing uncertainty are illustrated. Common to all steps are that the Beta
probability function was used to assess the impact of uncertainty. This is motivated by its13
mathematical tractability allowing for linear transformation over intervals and the flexibility in
modeling skewness in the density function. The Beta function also includes the uniform
distribution, used by Alvarez, Kanniainen and Södersten to illustrate timing uncertainty, as a
special case.
Illustration of timing uncertainty
The question of interest here is how uncertainty over the timing of a thorough reformation of
support linked to the current capital stock affects investment decisions in the pre-reform
period. Crucial in analyzing the effects of timing uncertainty is the length of the interval over
which the farmer finds the reform likely to occur. The previous Uruguay-round of WTO
extended over 8 years and this is also the assumed length of the timing uncertainty period in
this illustration. The sensitivity of this assumption will be shown below. The next crucial step
is when in time the uncertainty region starts. Since the peace clause in the Agricultural
Agreement expires in year 2003 and year 2000 is assumed to be the base year, the
uncertainty region was chosen to be [ ] 11 , 3 .
Four cases of timing uncertainty are then considered. The probability density
function associated with each case are depicted in Figure 1. Case 1 represents a situation
where the farmer expects the reform date to be in year 5. Case 2 represents an expected
reform at date 7. Case 3 has year 7 as the expected reform date but differs from case 2 by
having a larger standard deviation. That is to say that the farmer is less certain about a
reform at year 7. Case 3 will be used to analyze the impact of a mean preserving spread of
the timing uncertainty. In case 4 the farmer is more certain that the reform will occur late in
the region with an expected reform at year 9. Furthermore, the density functions for the14
cases 1, 2 and 4 have the same standard deviation (=1/8) while the standard deviation in
case 3 was set at 1/6. In order to isolate the incentive effects from timing uncertainty the cost
of land was calculated with eq. (15) for two farm operators, using a post-reform support
parameter w2  set at 5.4 percent (i.e. a reduction in support by 50 percent). For each case
illustrated one of the farmers is fully informed about the appropriate reform date while the
other farmer is uninformed. The difference in cost of land between the uninformed and the
informed farmer thus measures the impact of timing uncertainty. The results are displayed in



































































Figure 1. Probability density functions corresponding to each case of the expected
reform date.
Case 1 Case 2
Case 4
Case 315
Table 1. Long-term pre-reform cost of land, short-term cost of land corresponding
to each case of timing uncertainty and long-term post-reform cost of land.
(percentages).
Long-term pre-reform cost of land = 0.055265
Short-term pre-reform cost of land
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3, Case 4
 t* = 5  t* = 7  t* = 7 t* = 9
Time informed uninformed informed uninformed uninformed informed uninformed
0 0.091463 0.091577 0.086111 0.086209 0.086286 0.08155 0.081636
1 0.094477 0.094601 0.08868 0.088787 0.08887 0.083739 0.083832
2 0.097743 0.097877 0.091463 0.091579 0.091669 0.086111 0.086211
3 0.101281 0.101426 0.094477 0.094603 0.094701 0.08868 0.088788
4 0.105114 0.100378 0.097743 0.097876 0.097909 0.091463 0.09158
5 0.109265 0.102777 0.101281 0.101238 0.100804 0.094477 0.094602
6 0.105114 0.10403 0.103083 0.097743 0.097818
7 0.109265 0.10593 0.104832 0.101281 0.10103
8 0.105114 0.103902
9 0.109265 0.106206
Long-term post-reform cost of land = 0.109265
It is clear by comparing the long-term pre- and post-reform cost of land that a
reduction of policy support linked to the capital stock has strong effects upon the investment
incentives at the farm level. Another way of viewing the results is in term of the implicit land
rent required by the land owner to himself or from a leaseholder in order to satisfy the
required rate of return on land. A reduction of the policy support parameter should then
increase the long-term land rent through the increase of the required rate of return.
The short-term cost of land captures the investment incentive following the
announcement of a reform reducing acreage payments. The immediate result is an increase
of the cost of land so that the short-term cost is higher than the long-term pre-reform level.
This finding, equal to the informed as well as the uninformed farm operator, implicates that
the announcement triggers anticipatory adjustments in investment and/or in land rents. A
comparison between the four cases considered gives that this anticipatory effect is higher the16
closer to the current date in the interval of uncertainty the reform is expected (or known).
Equal to all cases is that the short-term pre-reform cost of land of the informed farm
operator gradually adjust so that it equals the post-reform level at the date of the reform.
Although the uninformed farm operator also experiences an increase in the short-term cost
of land over the pre-reform period, the lack of information about the actual reform date
creates a higher anticipatory effect as compared to the informed farm operator. Thus, initially
the short -term pre-reform cost of land is higher for the uninformed farmer. When
approaching the expected reform date the situation is reversed so that the short-term cost is
lower for the uniformed operator. This shift is explained by the continuos reassessment of
information about the expected reform date that starts when the uninformed farm operator
enters the region of uncertainty. Close to the expected reform date the uninformed operator
still have believes of a reform at a later date, the occurring reform therefore appears as a
surprise. The result is an over-investment by the uninformed farmer as compared to the
informer farmer. At the end of the uncertainty interval the short-term cost of land equals the
long-term post-reform cost of land. This holds for all cases considered in this illustration. It
should be noted that the formation of believes about the timing of the reform is important in
determining the difference in short-term costs between the uninformed and the informed
operator. The difference is most negative close to the expected reform date when the
density function is more skewed to the left (case 1) and less negative when skewed to the
right.
Case 3 illustrates the impact of a mean-preserving spread in the uncertainty around
the expected reform year 7. The short-term cost of land is in this case initially higher as
compared to the uniformed farm operator in case 2, inducing a lower investment incentive17
and/or higher land rents. After year 4 the situation is reversed so that case 3 reveals a lower
cost of land as compared to case 2. In line with Proposition 1 it is found that a mean
preserving increase in timing uncertainty induces higher anticipatory adjustment effects and
makes the farm operator to more likely to misapprehend the reform date.
To analyze the sensitivity of the results illustrated, the short-term cost of land was
first calculated for case 1 and 4 by increasing the standard deviation of the pdf, secondly by
using the narrower interval of uncertainty [ ] 4 10 ,  in case 2, and thirdly by using a higher
discount rate.
In a first attempt to reveal the impact of higher timing uncertainty simulations were
performed with a mean preserving spread in the pdf for case 1 and 4. However, the Beta
function then becomes U-shaped when the interval of uncertainty is remained fixed with very
high anticipatory effect in the beginning, low in the middle, and again high levels at the end of
the uncertainty region since either the a-parameter or the b-parameter of the Beta
distribution has to be <1 in order to preserve the mean. Although this property of the Beta
function possesses no analytical difficulties, the economic consequences becomes less
appealing, implicating a corresponding U-shaped short-term cost of land development.
Increasing the standard deviation from 1/8 to 1/6 is therefore given the interpretation that the
farm operator becomes less certain with respect to the anticipated reform date. The
expected reform date thereby becomes year 6.2 and year 7.8 in case 1 and 4, respectively.
In case 1 this gives that the value of the anticipatory term in (15) decreases due to that a
larger part of the probability mass is placed on later dates within the region of uncertainty
and therefore more affected by discounting. Hence, the short-term cost of land decreases by
increasing uncertainty. On the contrary, if the farm operator becomes less certain of the18
reform date in case 4, the anticipatory term in (15) increases. Increasing uncertainty then
reduces the investment incentives in this case.
The ceteris paribus effect of the alternative interval is to increase the anticipatory
effect with the short-term cost of land amounting to 8.6166 percent for the uniformed farm
operator at t=0 and to 10.6734 percent at the expected reform year 7. This means that a
shorter interval will trigger smaller initial adjustment in investment and instead larger
adjustments later in the region of uncertainty.
The ceteris paribus effect of using a higher discount rate is to decrease the
anticipatory effect, thus creating lower incentives to adjust to the proposed policy. This
effect is due to the convexity of the discount factor.
The impact of timing uncertainty revealed in this illustration appears inconclusive with
the recent results of Alvarez, Kanniainen and Södersten. for corporate firms, but are not.
Their short-term cost of capital is initially lower for the uninformed firm vis avi the informed
firm and then reversing so that the uniformed firm reveals a higher short-term cost at the
expected reform date. The difference in effect of timing uncertainty is due to that they are
considering a reduction in the tax rate which stimulates investment. According to Proposition
1, our result would have been similar to the result by Alvarez, Kanniainen and Södersten if
farm operators would have had reasons to expect an increase in the support parameter
instead of a reduction.
Illustration of parameter uncertainty
The question of interest here is how uncertainty with respect to the reduction in the support
parameter in a thorough reformation of support linked to the current capital stock affects19
investment decisions in the pre-reform period. As is clear from (15), a lower value of the
post-support parameter increases the anticipatory adjustment. Based on the idea that
looking at a future reform, farm operators “would frame the possibilities in terms of the
extremes” (Duffy, p. 147), three cases are then considered in illustrating the impact of
uncertainty. Case 1 assumes a belief of the farm operator for a post-reform support
parameter value of 2.7 percent out of the market value of land on an annual basis with a
standard deviation of 1/8. Case 2 illustrates a mean-preserving spread to a standard
deviation of 1/6. Finally, case 3 represent a situation where the farm operator becomes less
certain of an extreme reduction in the support parameter. Case 3 has the same standard
deviation as case 2 but with an expected mean of 4 percent. The Beta probability density








































































































The numerical simulation of a mean preserving increase in the parameter uncertainty
confirms that the anticipatory adjustment term in (15) is unaffected and therefore leaves the
investment incentives unchanged. Case 3 is of more interest. Suppose that the farm operator
initially frames the low extremes and then becomes less certain of the expected value. When
the Beta function is skewed to the left such an increase in the standard deviation of the
density function will increases the expected mean and act to reduce the anticipatory
adjustment term in (15). This increase in uncertainty will therefore reduce the short-term cost
of land. If the farm operator initially has expectations that are skewed to the right and then
becomes less certain of the post-reform parameter the opposite result is obtained. The
expected mean decreases resulting in an increase in the short-term cost of land.
Simultaneous increase in support parameter and timing uncertainty
Given the cases considered there exist ( ) 2 3 ￿  combinations of simultaneous increases in
support parameter and timing uncertainty. Initially, the farm operator may expect the post-
reform support parameter to be either a low extreme or a high extreme on the interval
[ ] 0 1 ,w . In addition, the farm operator may expect the reform date to be either early, in the
middle or late on the interval of uncertainty [ ] 311 , . The increase in uncertainty was modeled
by increasing the standard deviation in each combination from 1/8 to 1/6 for each support
parameter level and expected reform date, respectively. Table 2 summarizes the effect on
the short-term cost of land.
The effect of a simultaneous increase in uncertainty on the short-term cost of land is
found ambiguous. The incentive effects of higher uncertainty in the two symmetrical
combinations (low support parameter, early expected reform) and (high support parameter,21
late expected reform) and in the combination (high support parameter, mean preserving
expected reform) are however reinforcing with an unambiguous reduction (increase) of the
short-term cost of land. The incentive effects associated with higher support parameter and
timing uncertainty in the asymmetrical combinations (low support parameter, late expected
reform date) and (high support parameter, early expected reform date) are counteracting.
An equal increase in uncertainty results in a larger effect on the expected support parameter
as compared to the expected date of the reform. The increase (decrease) in the expected
post-reform value of the support parameter therefore outweighs the effect of an earlier
(later) expected reform date. The same mechanism applies to the combinations (low support
parameter, mean preserving expected reform date). Although a mean preserving increase in
timing uncertainty increases the anticipatory term in (15), this is outweighed by the reduction
of the difference  [ ] E 2 1 w w -  caused by the less certainty of framing a low extreme post-
reform support parameter.22
Table 2. Causality and impact on the short-term pre-reform cost of land by a






reform support level low




( ) [ ] s t t * * ›￿ ﬂ E
low
( ) [ ] s w w 2 2 ›￿ › E decrease decrease decrease
high
( ) [ ] s w w 2 2 ›￿ ﬂ E increase increase increase
Notes:  ( ) () › ﬂ    means increase (decrease),   symbolises the standard deviation. s .
Conclusions
The results emerging from this study shows the existence of anticipatory adjustments in
current investment by the announcement of agricultural policy programs linked to the capital
stock of the farm firm. Closed form solutions for the implied adjustment prior to the reform
are provided by the wedge between the short-run (pre-reform) cost of capital and the long-
run (pre-reform) cost of capital. In addition, it is shown that the anticipatory adjustment
effect consists of two complementary mechanisms, the pure expectation effect and the
uncertainty effect. When confronted with a reduction in support levels farm operators23
immediately embarks a gradual adjustment process with incentives to slow down investment.
If instead a policy reform with an increase in support level is proposed farm operator faces
an adjustment with higher investment incentives.
The model developed allows for a separation between uncertainty over the timing of
the reform and uncertainty with respect to the size of the support instrument. The
applicability of the model was demonstrated through a numerical analysis of the cost of land
in a reformation of the European acreage payments system. The question then arises to what
extent agricultural policy uncertainty is harmful to investment.
By numerical methods it was shown that a firm commitment to a more stable date of
the reform is less harmful because of the reduction of uncertainty. The distorting effect of
timing uncertainty is higher the closer to the current date the reform is expected. Lack of
information also creates an inefficient capital employment by making farm operators to over
invest at the reform date. This inefficiency is found reinforced by higher timing uncertainty
which makes farm operator more likely to misapprehend the reform date.
The effect of uncertainty over the post-reform level of the parameter measuring the
level of linked support where found dependent upon the initial believes of farm operators.
When the post-reform parameter is expected to be a low extreme on the interval of
uncertainty, increasing uncertainty reduces the anticipatory adjustment. If, however, the
post-reform parameter initially is expected to be a high extreme, increasing uncertainty
increases the anticipatory adjustment with a further decrease in investment.
Finally, it was found that increasing parameter uncertainty outweighs the effects of a
simultaneous equal increase in timing uncertainty in the cost of land measure. The implication
is that an increase in the noise around the outcome of multilateral trade negotiations with24
respect to the acceptable support linked to the capital stock has surprisingly volatile and
ambiguous effects on farm level investment. In order to be as less harmful as possible to the
allocation of capital, policy makers should therefore strive to reveal information of proposed
reforms, especially concerning the support levels, as accurately as possible.
The outcome of this study has implications for the dynamics of land rents and should
therefore be of relevance in the evolution of land values. Future research is warranted on this
issue, especially in incorporating the effects of inflation and risk aversion of the farm
operators to the model developed. Risk attitudes was considered in an early stage of this
paper but not incorporated since it is not clear if there exists an analytical solution. Another
interesting field for future research would be to investigate to what extent the obtained results
hold up empirically.
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